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I.

Introduction and Summary of Conclusions∗

A. Issues
This memorandum addresses U.S. law authorizing “surrender” of indicted
accused arrested in the United States to the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(“ICTR”). The first part of this memorandum identifies the difference between surrender
and extradition. The second part of this memorandum includes a note on the surrender
proceedings of Elizaphan Ntakirutimana. The third part of this memorandum discusses
the status of these indictees or non-indicted criminals after the sunset of the Tribunals.
Particular attention is paid to their refugee and immigration status under U.S. law with
reference to the situation of former World War II Nazis.
B. Summary of Conclusions
(1) The Surrender Agreements Allow Surrender to the Tribunals Without an
Extradition Treaty
Transfers to the Tribunals are deemed surrender, not extradition. In international
law, if a fugitive is requested by a State with which no extradition arrangement already
exists, there is no general international duty to extradite or punish the fugitive.1 The
surrender agreements between the U.S. and the Tribunals eliminate most of the traditional
exceptions to extradition when a traditional Article II Treaty is absent.

∗

ISSUE 18: Prepare a summary and analysis of U.S. law authorizing “surrender” of indicted accused
arrested in the United States to ICTY and ICTR. Prepare a note on the surrender proceedings (through the
U.S. Supreme Court) of E. Ntakirutimana. How is surrender different than extradition? What happens to
these indictees or non-indicted criminals after the sunset of the Tribunals? Will their refugee status be
affected (analyze this with reference to the situation of former World War II Nazis)?
1
GEOFF GILBERT, TRANSNATIONAL FUGITIVE OFFENDERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
EXTRADITION AND OTHER MECHANISMS 47 (1998). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
55.]

1

(2) The Surrender Proceedings of Elizaphan Ntakirutimana Lead to the
Conclusion That it is Constitutional to Surrender an Indicted Criminal to
the Tribunals With a Statute and an Executive Agreement
Even though the Ntakirutimana trilogy failed in its attempt to define concrete
guidelines that the government or future courts can follow in future surrender
proceedings to the Tribunals, the Fifth Circuit did hold that it is constitutional to
surrender an indicted criminal to the Tribunals with a statute and an executive agreement.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s order denying Ntakirutimana’s writ of habeas
corpus regarding an extradition request and lifted a stay of extradition stemming from
charges of genocide by the ICTR. The Fifth Circuit held that a statute authorized
extradition and evidence supported probable cause. The ultimate goal of the
government—to surrender Ntakirutimana to the ICTR—was accomplished. However,
the majority opinion is not a ringing endorsement of the Tribunal’s claim. The
Ntakirutimana trilogy—the magistrate, district court, and court of appeals decisions—
belie two important revelations about genocide and mass violations of human rights.
First, the decisions did not rely on past genocide cases or principles of international law
showing that ordinarily good people can be induced to commit terrifying crimes. Second,
the decisions did not discuss that the “community of nations” has sought an extended
jurisdictional reach for genocide prosecutions.
(3) U.S. Law Precludes Immigration Relief to Indictees and Non-Indicted
Criminals Who Have Committed Acts of Genocide
Even though the Ex Post Facto provision of the United States Constitution has
precluded criminal prosecution of World War II Nazis, civil deportation and
denaturalization proceedings embody the spirit of Nuremberg and remain the norm for
dealing with indicted and non-indicted war criminals. The Immigration and

2

Naturalization Act of 1990 (“INA of 1990”) bars immigration relief to aliens who have
participated in Nazi persecution or who have committed acts of genocide. Specifically,
the INA of 1990 contains, among other provisions, the following restrictions: (a)
ineligibility for admission; (b) preclusion from waiver of inadmissibility; (c)
denaturalization; (d) ineligibility for withholding of removal on grounds of anticipated
persecution; (e) deportation; (f) ineligibility for voluntary departure; and (g) ineligibility
for cancellation of removal.2 U.S. case law dealing with Nazi war criminals is helpful in
analyzing the refugee and immigration status of former World War II Nazis, and assists
courts and lawmakers in ascertaining the refugee and immigration status of indictees or
non-indicted criminals from Rwanda or the Former Yugoslavia.

II.

Factual Background
Unlike the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (“Nuremberg Tribunal”),

where the victorious Allied Forces surrendered defendants, the ICTR is entirely
dependent on states’ fulfilling their obligations under the ICTR Statute, adopted as a
Chapter VII binding resolution of the United Nations Security Council (U.N.S.C.) to
arrest and surrender accused in their home countries.3 Following the death in a plane
crash of, among other people, the President of Rwanda, elements of Rwanda’s majority
Hutu group initiated a massive wave of killings directed primarily against the minority
Tutsi group.4 From April 6 to the end of June 1994, an estimated 500,000 to 1 million

2

See infra notes 192-212 and accompanying text.
Theodor Meron, The Case for War Crimes Trials in Yugoslavia, FOREIGN AFF., Summer 1993, at 122,
133 (“in contrast to Nuremberg, the ad hoc tribunal for the former Yugoslavia will probably not enjoy the
cooperation of the authorities controlling the territory in which the crimes were committed”) [Reproduced
in the accompanying notebook at Tab 79.] See also Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda
(hereinafter ICTR Statute) [Annex to U.N. SCOR Res. 955] art. 28, reprinted in 33 ILM 1598, 1612 (1994).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1.]
4
Elizaphan Ntakirutimana v. Janet Reno, et al, 184 F.3d 419, 421 (1999). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 27.]
3

3

persons were killed.5 United Nations (“U.N.”) and other investigations established that
the mass killings were planned in advance of the plane crash and were motivated by
ethnic hatred.6
After the Tutsi tribe triumphed and overthrew the Hutu government, the new
Tutsi-dominated government asked the U.N. to create an international war crimes
tribunal. As a result, the U.N.S.C. acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, adopted
Resolution 955, establishing an international tribunal to prosecute those responsible for
the genocide.7 Appended to the resolution was the Statute governing the ICTR, which
required U.N. member states to “cooperate fully with the International Tribunal and its
organs” and to “comply without undue delay with any request for . . . the arrest or
detention of persons” and for the “surrender or the transfer of the accused” to the ICTR.8
In accordance with its obligations under the U.N. resolution, the United States
entered into an executive agreement with the ICTR, the Agreement on Surrender of
Persons (“Surrender Agreement”), in which the United States undertook to “surrender to
the Tribunal . . . persons . . . found in its territory whom the Tribunal has charged with . . .
a violation or violations within the competence of the Tribunal.”9
On February 10, 1996, Congress enacted a statute, section 1342 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (“Defense Act of 1996”), implementing
the two executive agreements with the ICTR and ICTY concerning surrender of

5

Id.
Id.
7
U.N. SCOR Res. 955, supra note 3. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1.]
8
ICTR Statute, supra note 3, art. 28, §§ 1, 2(d) & (e). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
1.]
9
Agreement on Surrender of Persons, January 24, 1995, U.S.-Int’l Trib. Rwanda, available in 1996 WL
165484. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 17.]
6

4

accused.10 Section 1342, amending the provisions of chapter 209 of title 18, United
States Code, provides that the existing statutes relating to extradition11 “shall apply in the
same manner and extent to the surrender of persons . . . to . . . the International Tribunal
for Rwanda, pursuant to the [surrender] agreement.”12 Section 1342 modified U.S.
domestic law to comply with ICTR requests to arrest and surrender fugitives.13

III.

The Use of Surrender When Extradition is Unavailable

A. Definition of Surrender
Technically, transfers to the Tribunal are deemed surrender, not extradition.14 In
international law, if a fugitive is requested by a State with which no extradition
arrangement already exists, there is no general international duty to extradite or punish
the fugitive.15 Under international law, a state is free to extradite and is not limited to the
explicit terms of the treaty as a matter of comity.16 “Nations are authorized,

10

National Defense Authorization Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, § 1342, 110 Stat. 186, 486 (1996)
(“Judicial Assistance to the International Tribunal for Yugoslavia and to the International Tribunal for
Rwanda”) [hereinafter NDAA]. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 3.]
11
See 18 USC §§ 3181-3196 (1996). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 3.]
12
NDAA § 1342(a)(1)(B). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 3.]
13
Kenneth J. Harris and Robert Kushen, Prosecuting International Crime: Surrender of Fugitives to the
War Crimes Tribunals for Yugislavia and Rwanda: Squaring International Legal Obligations with the U.S.
Constitution, 7 CRIM. L.F. 561, 564 (1996). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 70.]
Modifications have historically taken a variety of forms: statutes, executive actions, and international
agreements. While the Tribunals are supranational entities, the means of surrender to them have been
shaped to a certain extent by the law and practice of individual states in the area of bilateral extradition. Id.
14
The government used the term “extradition” in its requests to the Federal District Court and the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals. Due to common use of the two terms, the decisions used both surrender and
extradition interchangeably.
15
GILBERT, supra note 1, at 47. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 55.]
16
See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 666 (1992) (“to imply from the terms of this Treaty
that it prohibits obtaining the presence of an individual by means outside of the procedures the Treaty
establishes requires a much larger inferential leap, with only the most general of international law
principles to support it.”) It should be noted that neither Appellant or Appelle relied on the Supreme
Court’s opinion in Alvarez-Machain. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 44.]
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notwithstanding the terms of an extradition treaty, to voluntarily render an individual to
the other country on terms completely outside of those provided in the Treaty.”17
When the accused is already in the custody of the national authorities of the state
concerned as a result of a provisional arrest order issued by Office of the Prosecutor at
the Tribunals, or action taken by the national authorities on their own initiative, the
Tribunal may issue an order for the surrender of the accused.18 The term surrender refers
to the situation in which a person is already in custody pursuant to action taken by
national authorities under national law.19 An order by a Trial Chamber for the surrender
or transfer of persons to the custody of the Tribunal is considered to be the application of
an enforcement measure under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.20 The ICTR Statute
refers to orders for surrender rather than requests for extradition to distinguish an order
issued by the Tribunal from a request made by a state.21 This is the fundamental
difference between the terms surrender and extradition.
According to Professors Morris and Scharf, the use of surrender is consistent with
the Nuremberg precedent. Morris and Scharf argue that a state will not be relieved of the
obligation to comply with a surrender order where domestic legal impediments to
extradition exist. This general principle has its basis in Rule 58,22 identifying

17

GILBERT, supra note 1, at 47. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 55.]
1VIRGINIA MORRIS AND MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER’S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 207 (1995).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 52.]
19
Id. at 7 N. 555.
20
Id. at 209-10.
21
Id. at 210.
22
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. ITR/3/REV.1
(1995), entered into force 29 June 1995.
National Extradition Provisions
The obligations laid down in Article 28 of the Statute shall prevail over any legal impediment to
the surrender or transfer of the accused to the Tribunal which may exist under the national law or
extradition treaties of the State concerned.
18

6

international law supremacy over national law, based in member states’ obligations in the
U.N. Charter.23 The Nuremberg precedent is particularly pertinent to the case of accused
being surrendered to the Tribunals because the U.N. General Assembly unanimously
approved the principles.24 Morris and Scharf thus argue that surrender is not extradition
and should not require a treaty. Many countries now surrender fugitives to the Tribunals
without any treaty on this basis.
B. Process of Surrender and the Constitutional Dilemma
In the United States, the rules of extradition are inapplicable in these situations
since they are not expressly incorporated in the Statutes, Rules or domestic legislation
regarding the ICTR.25 The United States Supreme Court has held, however, that the
executive is not constitutionally authorized to surrender accused (extradite) without
concurrence of the legislative branch.26 The constitutional question concerns what form
that concurrence must take. Extradition from the United States has been effected
pursuant to bilateral extradition treaties in all but a very few cases. The exceptions
usually involve situations where a country is not then wholly independent of the United

23

MORRIS AND SCHARF, supra note 18, at 212-13. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 52.]
Id. at 10 (referring to the Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of
the Nuremberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/64/Add 1, at 188 (1946)).
25
GILBERT, supra note 1, at 49. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 55.]
26
See Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 8-9 (1936) (“The surrender of its citizens by
the Government of the United States must find its sanction in our law. It cannot be doubted that the power
to provide for extradition is a national power; it pertains to the national government and not to the States…
But, albeit a national power, it is not confided to the Executive in the absence of treaty or legislative
provision. At the very beginning, Mr. Jefferson, as Secretary of State, advised the President: ‘The laws of
the United States, like those of England, receive every fugitive, and no authority has been given to their
Executives to deliver them up.’… As stated by John Bassett Moore in his treatise on Extradition—
summarizing the precedents—‘the general opinion has been, and practice has been in accordance with it,
that in the absence of a conventional or legislative provision, there is no authority vested in any department
of the government to seize a fugitive criminal and surrender him to a foreign power’). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 49.]
24
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States.27 The Surrender Agreements thus represent a departure from U.S. bilateral
extradition treaties by eliminating traditional exceptions to extradition and thus
foreclosing certain implied defenses that result from the absence of an extradition treaty.
C. Section 1342’s Impact on Existing Law Relating to Extradition
Section 1342 of the Defense Act of 1996 amends chapter 209 of title 18 of the
U.S. Code, Crimes and Criminal Procedure, in order to implement the Surrender
Agreement. Chapter 209 contains provisions addressing those critical aspects of
extradition practice not normally governed by bilateral extradition treaties.28 Until the
enactment of section 1342, these extradition provisions did not refer to the surrender of
criminals to international tribunals, such as the ICTR. Accordingly, section 1342(a)(1) of
the legislation amends chapter 209 of title 18 to make these provisions equally applicable
to the surrender of persons to the Tribunals pursuant to the Surrender Agreements. Most
significant are those provisions that grant authority to the executive branch to surrender a
fugitive at the conclusion of U.S. judicial proceedings.29 Section 318630 confers final
authority upon the Secretary of State to surrender fugitives with respect to whom U.S.
courts have ruled that the requirements for extradition have been met, while section 3196
permits the surrender of U.S. citizens even where the applicable treaty does not oblige the
United States to do so.31

27

The government also relied on a 1985 congressional-executive agreement allowing extradition from the
United States, the Marshall Island Extradition Framework, with the courts applying Title 18, chapter 209.
(referring to the executive agreement between the United States and the Marshall Islands, Extraditions from
the United States to the Marshall Islands pursuant to the extradition provisions of an executive-agreement,
the Agreement on Extradition, Mutual Assistance in Law Enforcement Matters, and Penal Sanctions of Oct.
10, 1986, U.S.-Marshall Is. & Fed. States of Micronesia, TIAS No. 1161).). See Harris and Kushen, supra
note 13, at 578, n. 47. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 70.]
28
Harris and Kushen, supra note 13, at 590. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 70.]
29
Id. at 591.
30
18 U.S.C. 3186 (2002). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 3.]
31
18 U.S.C. 3196 (2002). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 3.]
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In addition, several sections provide the framework for U.S. proceedings pursuant
to a foreign country's request for extradition.32 Section 3184 sets forth the procedures for
the issuance of arrest warrants and the conduct of U.S. judicial proceedings.33 Section
3188 provides U.S. judicial authorities with discretion to release a fugitive in the event of
excessive delay in surrendering him or her to the requesting authority.34 Section 3190
provides for the admission of evidence in an extradition proceeding where that evidence
has been certified by the principal U.S. diplomatic or consular officer resident in the
country requesting extradition.35 Section 3191 provides for the production of witnesses
on behalf of indigent fugitives.36 Finally, section 3194 governs the authority of agents of
the requesting state to transport a surrendered fugitive from U.S. territory,37 and section
3195 governs the allocation of the costs of extradition.38 Section 1342(a)(4) specifies for
surrender proceedings, as in international extradition proceedings, that neither the Federal
Rules of Evidence nor the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are applicable.39 Section

32

Harris and Kushen, supra note 13, at 591. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 70.]
18 U.S.C. 3184 (2002). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 3.]
34
18 U.S.C. 3188 (2002). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 3.]
35
18 U.S.C. 3190 (2002). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 3.] Since the Tribunals are
not sovereign states, section 1342(a)(2) of the implementing legislation extends section 3190 authority to
such principal U.S. diplomatic or consular officers so that they may certify the evidence forwarded in
support of a surrender request. NDAA § 1342(a)(2). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab.]
Section 1342(a)(3) of the act ensures that the United States is responsible for most costs, by stating that the
agreements' cost provisions prevail over those in 18 U.S.C. § 3195. NDAA § 1342(a)(3). The Tribunals
bear the cost only of transporting fugitives and translating documents. With this modification, the practice
with respect to the Tribunals corresponds to modern extradition treaty practice. Harris and Kushen, supra
note 13, at 592.
36
18 U.S.C. 3191 (2002). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 3.]
37
18 U.S.C. 3194 (2002). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 3.]
38
18 U.S.C. 3195 (2002). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 3.]
39
NDAA § 1342(a)(4). See Fed. R. Evid. 1101(d)(3) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
4.] See Fed. R. Crim. P. 54(b)(5) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 5.] Extradition
proceedings have their own rules of evidence and procedure that are more flexible in part because foreign
governments should not be expected to be versed in U.S. criminal law and procedure. Harris and Kushen,
supra note 13, at 592. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 70.] Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181,
184-85 (1902) (where the Supreme Court considered the extradition of a fugitive to Russia even though the
evidence supporting the petition did not meet the requirements of the treaty between the two countries).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 29.]
33
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1342(a)(4) aligns itself with an old Supreme Court decision holding that even if
extradition is not authorized by a treaty, the Court should uphold it based on a lesser
evidentiary showing. In reaching this conclusion, the Court held that “Congress has a
perfect right to provide for the extradition of criminals in its own way, with or without a
treaty to that effect, and to declare that foreign criminals shall be surrendered upon such
proofs of criminality as it may judge sufficient.”40 Until section 1342’s implementation,
Congress had yet to provide for this lesser evidentiary showing.

IV.

Surrender Proceedings Through U.S. Supreme Court of
Ntakirumana: Summary and Analysis of U.S. Law Authorizing
“Surrender” of Indicted Accused and Arrested in the United States
to ICTY and ICTR

A. Practical and Constitutional Issues: Congressional-Executive Agreements as
a Basis for Surrender?
This section identifies the major challenge to the extradition of Ntakirutimana—
that the United States cannot surrender a criminal to a Tribunal without an affirmative
grant of extradition authority from Congress to the executive branch through a treaty or
statute.41 However, there appears to be no constitutional bar to using a multilateral
instrument per se as the legal basis for granting a surrender request. While section 3181
applies only "during the existence of any treaty of extradition with [a] foreign
government," it does not specify that this treaty be bilateral or be solely for the purpose of
extradition.42
The U.S. government had one option to rely on in surrendering Ntakirutimana.
The Surrender Agreement, combined with section 1342, is the only method to surrender
criminals such as Ntakirutimana. Reliance on current multilateral instruments, such as
40

Grin, 187 U.S. at 191. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 29.]
Harris and Kushen, supra note 13, 578-79. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 70.]
42
Id. at 580.
41
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the U.N. Charter, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (“Genocide Convention”), Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“Torture Convention”), and the
Geneva Conventions pose a constitutional problem for the purpose of surrender because
neither the executive branch during the negotiation process nor the Senate during the
ratification process envisioned their usage in this manner.43 The U.N. Charter, for
example, does not speak at all about the extradition or surrender of fugitives.
Consequently, the invocation of the U.N. Charter for the basis of surrender could raise
concerns about the Senate's constitutional role in the treaty-making process.44 Moreover,
because the implementing legislations for the Genocide Convention,45 the Geneva
Conventions,46 and the Torture Convention47 do not address surrender, U.S. courts might
consider the invocation of these agreements by themselves as a basis for surrender legally
inadequate.48
B. The Obligation to Surrender Under International Law
43

UN CHARTER; implemented by 22 U.S.C. §§ 287-287e (1946). [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 6.]
44
Harris and Kushen, supra note 13, at 579. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 70.]
45
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted Dec. 9, 1948, 78
U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951), [hereinafter Genocide Convention]; implemented by 18
U.S.C. §§ 1091-1093 (1988). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 7.]
46
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in
the Field, adopted Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 6 U.S.T. 3114 [hereinafter Geneva Convention I];
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members
of Armed Forces at Sea, adopted Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, 6 U.S.T. 3217 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, adopted Aug. 12, 1949,
75 U.N.T.S. 135, 6 U.S.T. 3317 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, adopted Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 6 U.S.T. 3516
[hereinafter Geneva Convention IV] (all entered into force Oct. 21, 1950); implemented War Crimes Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-192, § 2401(b), 110 Stat. 2104 (1996) (statute proscribing grave breaches of Geneva
Conventions applicable only where defendant is member of U.S. armed forces or U.S. national).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 8.]
47
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted
Dec. 10, 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984)
(as modified in 24 I.L.M. 535) (entered into force June 26, 1987), [hereinafter Torture Convention];
implemented by 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2002). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 9.]
48
Harris and Kushen, supra note 13, at 581. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 70.]
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The obligation on U.N. member states to render various forms of assistance to the
Tribunals (including but not limited to arrest, detention, and surrender) derives from
chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.49 Chapter VII gives the U.N.S.C. broad responsibility
"with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression," with
specific authority to "decide what measures shall be taken . . . to maintain or restore
international peace and security."50 Under article 41 of the Charter, the UNSC "may
decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give
effect to its decisions, and it may call upon Members of the United Nations to apply such
measures."51 The obligation on member states to carry out these measures is explicitly
stated in article 48(1) of the Charter: "The action required to carry out decisions of the
Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by
all the Members of the United Nations."52
The essence of the obligation on States to surrender fugitives to the Tribunals is
not present in the U.N. charter, but is expressed in operative paragraph 4 of U.N.S.C.
Resolution 827 (Yugoslavia),53 and operative paragraph 2 of Resolution 955 (Rwanda),
which both read as follows:

[The Security Council] Decides that all States shall cooperate fully
with the International Tribunal and its organs in accordance with the
present resolution and the Statute of the International Tribunal and
that consequently all States shall take any measures necessary under
49

Id. at 565. Brief for the Respondent/Appellee at 25-26, Elizaphan Ntakirutimana v. Janet Reno et al.,
184 F.3d 419 (5th Cir. 1999) (No. 98-41597). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 83.]
(Citing Declaration of Michael J. Matheson, contained in Addendum E of the Brief, “The Department of
State, through the Matheson declaration, has made clear its view that the Tribunal is lawfully created under
the authority of the Security Council.”
50
UN CHARTER art. 39. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 21.]
51
UN CHARTER art. 41. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 21.]
52
UN CHARTER art. 48(1). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 21.]
53
S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., par. 4, S/RES/827 (1993). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 20.]
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their domestic law to implement the provisions of the present
resolution and the Statute, including the obligation of States to
comply with requests for assistance or orders issued by a Trial
Chamber under Article 28 of the Statute . . . .54
Moreover, article 19 of the ICTY Statute,55 and article 18 of the ICTR Statute56
describe a state’s duty to arrest criminals upon a showing of an offense. Orders for arrest,
detention, surrender, or transfer of persons in a particular case can be issued upon
confirmation of an indictment against that person.57 Under these articles, indictments
must be based on a finding by the prosecutor, and confirmed by a judge of a trial chamber
that the prosecutor has established a prima facie case of an offense within the jurisdiction
of the Tribunal.58

C. The ICTR Indictments of Ntakirutimana
In June 1996, the ICTR charged Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, a seventy-two-year-old
Rwandan national, with genocide, complicity in genocide, conspiracy to commit
genocide, and three separate crimes against humanity (murder of civilians, extermination
of civilians, and inhuman acts).59 In September, 1996, the ICTR confirmed a second

54

ICTR Statute, supra note 3, art. 28. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1.] Article 28
states, in relevant part:
1. States shall cooperate with the International Tribunal [for Rwanda] in the investigation and
prosecution of persons accused of committing serious violations of international humanitarian law.
2. States shall comply without undue delay with any request for assistance or an order issued by a Trial
Chamber, including, but not limited to: . . .
(d) the arrest or detention of persons;
(e) the surrender or the transfer of the accused to the International Tribunal [for Rwanda].
55
Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991
(hereinafter ICTY Statute), U.N. Doc. S/25704 at 36, annex (1993) and S/25704/Add.1 (1993), art. 19,
adopted by Security Council on 25 May 1993, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 2.]
56
ICTR Statute, supra note 3, art. 18. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1.]
57
Harris and Kushen, supra note 13, at 567. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 70.]
58
Id.
59
Brief of the Respondent/Appellee, supra note 49, at Addendum B, The International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda, Indictment of June 17, 1996. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 83.]
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indictment charging Ntakirutimana and his son with genocide, complicity in genocide,
conspiracy to commit genocide, crimes against humanity, and serious violations both of
common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II.60
On September 26, 1996, Ntakirutimana was arrested by U.S. law enforcement
authorities in Laredo, Texas, where he was lawfully residing. A former pastor of the
Seventh Day Adventist Church in Mugonero, Rwanda, and an ethnic Hutu, he was
accused of luring several hundred ethnic Tutsis to his church complex in the days
immediately following the death of Rwandan President Habyarimana, and then
participating in the attack on the complex that left many of the Tutsis dead.
Ntakirutimana was also accused of working with armed bands in the Bisesero region to
hunt down both the survivors of that attack and other Tutsis.61 The tradition in Rwanda
was to take shelter in churches. Because pastors are Christian, it was thought that
nothing harmful could happen in the churches. Ntakirutimana, the church president, was
personally instructing Tutsis to gather at the Adventist complex.62 However as time
passed, it was Ntakirutimana who called for the elimination of Tutsis seeking refuge in
the church.63
D. Ntakirutimana Trilogy: Part I—Magistrate Notzon

60

Brief of the Respondent/Appellee, supra note 49, at Addendum B, The International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda, Indictment of Sept. 7, 1996. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 83.]
61
See generally PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE KILLED
WITH OUR FAMILIES 25-43 (1998) (describing the events in Mugonero and Bisesero, including
Ntakirutimana’s alleged role therein. Gourevitch takes his title from a letter sent to Ntakirutimana on April
15, 1994, by a number of Tutsi pastors who had taken refuge in the Mugonero church; their prediction was
correct). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 59.]
62
Id. at 27.
63
Id. at 28-31.
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On October 18, 1996, the U.S. government filed its first request for
Ntakirutimana’s surrender.64 The surrender request was first heard by Magistrate Judge
Marcel C. Notzon (S.D. Tex.). On December 17, 1997, Notzon denied surrender without
a hearing. Notzon’s decision was based on a number of questionable legal rulings.65
First, he claimed that the United States had no authority to extradite to the ICTR, finding
no instance where an extradition has occurred without a treaty.66 Notzon deemed the
absence of a treaty “a fatal defect,” held the provisions of section 1342 unconstitutional,
and failed to consider the legal effect of the United States’ obligations under the U.N.
Charter and the Surrender Agreement between the United States and the ICTR.67
Second, Notzon considered the question of probable cause. The magistrate stated
(1) that the affidavit of the Belgian police officer implicating Ntakirutimana did not
include a statement establishing the witnesses’ veracity and reliability, and (2) that there
was no indication of the condition of the interviews and whether the witnesses “were
placed under oath prior to making their statements.”68 He also criticized the adequacy of
specific statements by the witnesses. Notzon concluded that the information in the
affidavit did not “rise to the level of probable cause.”69
E. Ntakirutimana Trilogy: Part II—District Judge Rainey

64

Brief for the Respondents/Appellee, supra note 49, at 2. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 83.]
65
Bartram S. Brown, Primacy of Complementarity: Reconciling the Jurisdiction of National Courts and
International Criminal Tribunals, 23 YALE J. INT’L L. 383, 412 (1998). [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 63.]
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
In re Surrender of Ntakirutimana, 988 F. Supp. 1038, 1043 (S.D.T.X. 1997). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 35.]
69
Id. at 1044.
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In response, the U.S. Departments of State and Justice coordinated with the ICTR
to refile its request on January 29, 1998, which was assigned to District Judge Rainey.70
An extradition request that has been denied can be renewed even if no new evidence is
present.71 Mr. Ntakirutimana was once again arrested.72
Judge Rainey resolved both the constitutional and, with the assistance of
additional affidavits, the probable cause claim in the government’s favor in an August 6,
1998 ruling.73 The court opined that the U.S. Constitution does not require that surrender
be made pursuant to an Article II treaty and that the evidence against Mr. Ntakirutimana
sufficed to establish probable cause.74
On August 26, 1998, Ntakirutimana filed a petition for habeas corpus.75 The
prospective extraditee can challenge the grant of a request by a limited form of review
available by means of his only recourse, habeas corpus, which, in turn, is appealable.76
The judge does not engage in plenary review, and the judge may be the same one as in

70

Brief for the Respondent/Appellee, supra note 49, at 3. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 83.] Extradition decisions are non-appeallable under 18 U.S.C. 3184. Ahmad v. Wigen, 910 F.2d
1063, 1065 (2d Cir. 1990). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 22.]
71
M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW & PRACTICE 778 (3d ed.
1996). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 58.] See also, United States v. Doherty, 786
F.2d 491, 496 (2d Cir. 1988) (“the Government's only remedy following denial of an extradition request is
to refile the request with another extradition magistrate”). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 45.] See also, Hooker v. Klein, 573 F.2d 1360, 1367-8 (9th Cir. 1978) (“it is well settled that a finding
of lack of probable cause does not bar the state from rearresting the suspect on the same charges. Because
the extraditing court does not render judgment on the guilt or innocence of the fugitive, it cannot be said
that an order of extraditability constitutes a final judgment for purposes of res judicata”). [Reproduced in
the accompanying notebook at Tab 31.]
72
Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 94 A.J.I.L.
102, 132 (2000). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 77.]
73
In re Surrender of Ntakirutimana, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22173 (S.D.T.X. 1998). [Reproduced in
the accompanying notebook at Tab 34.]
74
Murphy, supra note 72, at 132. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 77.]
75
Brief for the Respondent/Appellee, supra note 49, at 3. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 83.]
76
Id. See generally BASSIOUNI , supra note 71, 737-38, 778-79. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 58.] See also, In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122, 128 (2d Cir. 1981). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 33.]
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the extradition hearing.77 Although the habeas hearing is appealable, the standard of
review is highly deferential to the trial judge. A petition for habeas corpus is usually
presented to the federal district court following a grant of extradition, although the
decision need not be final before such relief is sought.78 The prospective extraditee can
also seek review before the circuit court of appeals from a denial of habeas corpus, and if
that is denied he may petition the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.79 In a habeas
corpus proceeding, the court’s consideration is limited to:
“matters of jurisdiction, the existence of a valid treaty of extradition, whether the
accused is actually the person whose extradition is sought, whether there is
‘probable cause’ both to believe he is the person sought and that the evidence
presented is sufficient to convince a reasonable person that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that he should be brought to trial, and finally that there are no
grounds under the treaty or United States law that would preclude extradition.”80
Judge Rainey heard the habeas appeal and denied it.
Ntakirutimana argued, in addition to his treaty and probable cause arguments, that
the U.N. Charter did not authorize the U.N.S.C. to establish the ICTR and that the ICTR
could not guarantee his fundamental rights. The court quickly dismissed these as
“beyond the scope of habeas review.”81
F. Ntakirutimana Trilogy: Part III—Fifth Circuit Appeal
The decision by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals consisted of a majority opinion
by Judge Garza, a concurring opinion by Judge Parker, and a dissenting opinion by Judge
DeMoss.
77

Oen Yin-Choy v. Robinson, 858 F.2d 1400, 1408 (9th Cir, 1988) (“[A] judge who presides over an
extradition hearing need not recuse and may hear a habeas corpus action.”) [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 39.]
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(1) Constitutional Question
Judge Garza, in the majority opinion, rejected Ntakirumana’s broader
constitutional argument that “The Constitution of the United States requires an Article II
treaty ratified by the Senate for the surrender of any person by the United States to the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.”82 Judge Garza distinguished the facts in
Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker83 from the facts in the case before him.
Ntakirutimana unsuccessfully argued that the government could not rely on Valentine to
give power to surrender because legal authority could come from two sources: a treaty
which is part of the supreme law of the land or congressional enactment.84 However, as
the majority opinion made clear, the legal instruments in Valentine were not sufficient
because neither authorized the President to surrender an American citizen.85
Ntakirutimana argued that the power to make treaties is vested exclusively in the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate, and relied on the words of the
Constitution, the debates in the Constitutional Convention, and the Federalist defense of
the proposed Constitution.86 He also claimed that U.N. Charter is not an extradition
treaty.87 Judge Garza concluded that the United States can act constitutionally either by
treaty or by executive agreement authorized by statute (forming a congressionalexecutive agreement).88 Judge Garza found that the Constitution “contemplates
alternative modes of international agreements. . . not strictly congruent with the
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formalities required by the Constitution’s Treaty Clause.”89 He cited Valentine, among
other authorities, to show that the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that a treaty or
statute may confer the power to extradite.90 Moreover, the treaty-making process remains
untainted because the President may still elect to submit a treaty to the Senate, instead of
submitting legislation to Congress, depending on the circumstances.91
Even though no specific precedent made it impermissible to allow surrender in the
absence of a treaty, Judge Garza also recognized that no specific precedent exists for
extradition to a foreign entity in the absence of a treaty.92 He rejected, however, the
claim that this historical practice reflected a constitutional limitation. He noted that when
the Supreme Court held in Valentine that the Constitution did not authorize the President,
acting alone, to extradite citizens, it stated that his power “is not confided to the
Executive in the absence of treaty or legislative provision.”93 The court in Valentine was
more concerned that the necessary authority to surrender an American citizen was
89
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missing in the form of a statute (the treaty included an exception clause barring delivery
of a country’s own citizens).94
One circuit court decision, Williams v. Rogers, interpreted the Supreme Court’s
ruling to mean that the government’s power to extradite must be given by statute or
treaty, and “requires only that there be a showing of some authority, whether in form of
congressional dictate or policy, or the provisions of an existing treaty, to provide a
legitimate basis for the surrender of fugitives from justice by this country to another.”95
Williams dealt with the remanding of a U.S. serviceman to stand trial in a country from
which he had been erroneously permitted to return to the United States.
At least one court, Hilario v. United States, also permitted extradition pursuant to
a statute authorizing extradition of United States citizens, and a treaty that, like that in
Valentine, permitted but did not require such extradition.96 The Hilario court held that
section 3196 “fill[ed] a gap in our domestic law to allow the Secretary of State to
surrender persons under the treaty.”97
Judge DeMoss, in dissent, claimed that a “structural reading of the Constitution
compels the conclusion that most international agreements must be ratified according to
the Treaty Clause of Article II”98; that is, by a two-thirds vote of the Senate. By contrast,
he noted, the statute at issue here – a floor amendment to the 1996 National Defense
Authorization Act – “slipped into law through the back door, without any public
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discussion or debate about its substantive merits.”99 Judge DeMoss criticized the
authorities relied on by the majority to extradite Ntakirutimana.100 First, he argued that
the extradition bears no relation to the subject matter of the Defense Act of 1996, and that
nothing related to the extradition provision was included in the original bills proposed to
Congress because extradition was not relevant to its subject matter.101 It was not,
continued Judge DeMoss, until Senator Arlen Specter (R-Pa) proposed it as a floor
amendment, after a request from the President, that the Senate accepted it without
discussion.102
Judge DeMoss conceded that some kinds of international agreements might be
made outside the treaty process. Nonetheless, “if the Treaty Clause is to have any
meaning,” other kinds may be concluded only by treaty, and historical practice indicated
that extradition is one of the subjects so restricted.”103 Judge DeMoss expressed concern
with not only constitutional law, but with the reach of international law: he described the
government as enforcing a warrant issued by the ICTR, “a nonsovereign entity created by
the United Nations Security Council, purporting to ‘DIRECT’ the officials of our
sovereign nation to surrender the accused.”104
(a) Two Historical Periods of Congressional-Executive Power
99
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The Garza/DeMoss battle over whether an Article II treaty, subject to Senate
consent, was always constitutionally required for the United States to bind itself to an
international obligation extends outside of the Fifth Circuit’s opinion. Two historical
periods are worth examining to determine how other courts may deal with this issue.
The issue of whether congressional-executive agreements could substitute Article
II treaties was intensely debated in the first historical period—1940s to the 1980s.105 The
government relied on the first historical period of the debate, which began to settle after
Justice Jackson’s famous concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, and was
solidified in Dames & Moore v. Regan, which restated Justice Jackson’s reference to the
“continuum of executive authority”: “When the President acts pursuant to an express or
implied authorization from Congress . . . the executive action ‘would be supported by the
strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation.”106
Consequently, it was thought that the President’s authority derived from an executive
agreement, and supported by Congress, was at its highest.
Ntakirutimana argued that such power was altered in the second historical
period—post 1980. He claimed that Weinberger v. Rossi limited the scope of
Youngstown Sheet and Tube and Dames & Moore, where the Supreme Court held that
“the President may enter into certain binding agreements with foreign nations without
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complying with the formalities required by the Treaty Clause.”107 Ntakirutimana claimed
that even if such consent was not required for all international obligations, it was required
for some substantial subset, including extradition agreements.108 No treaty authorized his
extradition, although the government argued that the U.N. Charter would suffice, given
that the Tribunal was established by a U.N.S.C. resolution.109 However, the majority
deemed it unnecessary to address whether the U.N. Charter, including obligations created
pursuant thereto, is constitutionally sufficient to require actions that might otherwise be
infringements on individual liberties. Judge DeMoss, on the other hand, agreed with
Ntakirutimana: “there is some variety of agreements which must be accomplished
through the formal Article II process,” and this category includes extradition because an
extradition agreement is a type of agreement historically found in a treaty and therefore
governed by the Treaty Clause.110
(b) The Academic Debate
Whether international agreements require a formal treaty process has recently
been the subject of heated academic debate in the United States, inspired in part by the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the World Trade Organization
(WTO), both of which involve major commitments made by the United States without an
Article II treaty. The constitutional law professor Laurence Tribe admits, “line drawing
in this area is especially complex,” and suggests that a key criterion would be the “impact
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of an agreement on state or national sovereignty.”111 Tribe contends that the
Constitutional makes clear, in Article I, that there is a distinction between treaties, which
states may never enter into, and other types of foreign agreements, which states may enter
with Congressional approval.112 Similarly, he believes that boundaries should also be
created around international agreements that the President, acting alone, may make
binding on the United States and the treaty power of the executive that the President must
submit for Senate approval.113
Extradition, especially to an international tribunal with a highly restricted
jurisdiction, does not fall within the that category of the former for a number of reasons.
Although “agreements relating to extradition . . . have traditionally been passed through
the Senate process,”114 the Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated that the Constitution
requires congressional assent to extradition but permits that assent to be manifested by
treaty or statute.115 Professor Detlev Vagts believes that the executive and legislative
branches look to tradition when deciding whether treaties or executive agreements are to
be used.116 “Agreements relating to extradition, freedom of establishment, taxation and
so forth have traditionally passed through the Senate …”117 However, Vagts does not
believe that this constitutional battle is of great relevance today.
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Tribe counters that the Treaty Clause would, wrongly, be purely optional if
congressional-executive agreements are considered full substitutes for treaties.118
According to Tribe, the WTO Agreement, which began as a congressional-executive
agreement, ended up receiving more than the required supermajority vote in the Senate,
and consequently it made little difference whether the agreement was processed through
the Treaty Clause of Article II or the congressional-executive agreement with bicameral
approval.119 Moreover, Tribe states that NAFTA, which received fewer votes in the
Senate than the Treaty Clause would have required, is not considered a treaty under the
terms of the Treaty Clause, and he therefore firmly believes that the shortcut taken by
NAFTA is not a “free-form” method of bypassing the Treaty Clause.120
Most commentators, unlike Tribe, and to an extent Vagts, widely accept the
congressional–executive agreement as a complete alternative to a treaty.121 Professor
Louis Henkin states, “There is little–or nothing–that is dealt with by treaty that could not
also be the subject of legislation by Congress.”122 The role of the Senate is not
prejudiced because Congress can authorize or approve the agreement and implement it
simultaneously.123 Because international agreements are primarily international acts and
make domestic law only incidentally, neither Congresses, nor Presidents, nor courts, have
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been seriously troubled by these conceptual difficulties and differences.124 Even though
its use is not as well defined, and difficulties may arise, the congressional-executive
agreement remains available to Presidents for wide and general use should the treaty
process prove difficult.125
In a tripartite system of government, commentators suggest, Congress has
numerous means of pressuring the President to use the treaty process in cases where
Congress views that process as desirable.126 For example, the Clinton administration was
criticized for acceding to Senate demands to subject certain military agreements to the
treaty process, such as the CFE Flank Agreement.127 However, scholars believe that the
question of whether to submit to the Treaty Process or to bicameral congressionalexecutive agreements is a tool for the Executive to prevail over an isolationist legislative
branch that plagues U.S. participation in world affairs, or offer concessions to the
legislative in a deal for something else.128 Consequently, many believe that the
Constitution remits to the political branches (and therefore not to the judiciary) whether
to employ the treaty process or the congressional-executive agreement alternative.
(2) Issue of Probable Cause
Judge Garza’s majority opinion held that the probable cause requirements of the
ICTR Statute129 are designed to meet the U.S. Constitutional standard and thus the district
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court did not err in dismissing the habeas petition.130 As the court noted, the finding
“must be upheld if there is any competent evidence in the record to support it.”131 The
affidavits were sufficient on their face: the witnesses were ordinary citizens; they were
familiar with Ntakirutimana; they provided first-person evidence of his actions; and their
statements corroborated one another.132
Ntakirutimana argued that the ICTR’s submission is unreliable and tainted in its
entirety and should be rejected as proof of probable cause,133 and that the purported
showing of probable cause fails to meet the Totality of Circumstances standard.134 The
majority rejected Ntakirutimana’s challenge to the witnesses’ credibility as outside the
scope of habeas review.135 It also rejected his challenge to the accuracy of the
translations, holding that extradition courts can and should “presume that the translations
are correct.”136 Any other rule would “place an unbearable burden upon extradition
courts and seriously impair the extradition process.”137 Finally, the majority refused to
consider his argument that “eyewitness accounts of traumatic events are inherently
unreliable”; that argument had not been raised during the district court proceedings.138
Ntakirutimana also made a series of other arguments, including the claim the
Tribunal would not protect his right to a fair trial. The court concluded that the rule of
noninquiry barred the court (though not the executive, which has the ultimate authority in
130
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extradition proceedings) from considering the fairness of proceedings following an
extradition.139 They did not address this issue.
Judge Parker offered a separate Concurring Opinion. Although he would also
dismiss the habeas petition, Judge Parker “invited the Secretary [of State] to closely
scrutinize the underlying evidence.”140 He stated that the evidence was “highly suspect”
because it relied on “unnamed Tutsi witnesses” and “questionable interpreters,” and
suggested that it reflected “a campaign of tribal retribution.”141 Judge Parker was deeply
skeptical of the truth of the charges and found it illogical to believe that a man such as
Ntakirutimana – who had no criminal record, had long been a peaceful church leader, and
was married to a Tutsi – “would somehow suddenly become a man of violence and
commit the atrocities for which he stands accused.”142 Ntakirutimana argued that the
government exaggerated the incriminating nature of its evidence–the fact that most of the
circumstances the government views as incriminating are consistent with Ntakirutimana’s
claim to innocence—and are thus an important circumstance in his favor in assessing
probable cause.143
(3) Habeas Relief
Ntakirutimana argued that the court should reverse the order denying habeas relief
because the ICTR cannot give him a fair trial.144 The government responded that the
court does not have the authority to reach the issue. The majority agreed that due to the
limited scope of habeas review, they could not inquire into the procedures that await
139
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Ntakirutimana in Arusha.145 The government argued that when an American citizen
commits a crime in another country, he cannot complain when he is required to submit to
their modes for trial. The government primarily based this argument on Neeley v.
Henkel, where the court permitted extradition to Cuba, then a territory under United
States military authority, pursuant to a statute and consistent with the treaty with Spain,
the former colonial power.146 The majority opinion concluded that this was beyond the
scope of habeas review, and that such matters should be left with the Department of State
which will have the final say in surrendering the accused to the ICTR.147
G. Concluding Comments and the Importance of the Trilogy
The Ntakirutimana trilogy failed in its attempt to define guidelines that the
government or subsequent courts can follow to address future surrender to the Tribunals
(even though the final decision rested with the Fifth Circuit and its decision to surrender
Ntakirutimana to the ICTR).148 First, the Fifth Circuit’s majority opinion is not a ringing
endorsement of the ICTR. The proceedings wrongly displayed insensitivity to the
international and cultural setting of the ICTR.149 Moreover, the majority refused to
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address or discredit the argument that reliability problems existed and tainted the effect of
its evidence.150 Further, the majority did not cite to cases, nor expressly reject
Ntakirutimana’s arguments,151 (1) establishing that there is no requirement that such
ordinary citizen-witnesses be placed under oath,152 and (2) that courts rarely express
concern in cases such as Ntakirutimana’s which involve ordinary citizens as witnesses.153
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit’s opinion stresses that it had to defer to the trial
judge’s decision (and thus a future magistrate could theoretically reach the same decision
that no probable cause existed if confronted with a similar factual scenario). The opinion
also rejects, solely on procedural grounds, the argument that the “traumatic events” that
the witnesses experienced make their accounts “inherently unreliable.” And the
concurring opinion, although not part of the majority, is troubling because it contends
that the decision to prosecute was based on tribal politics.
Second, the magistrate undercut the legitimacy of the witnesses in the affidavit.154
The magistrate ignored the less stringent “totality of the circumstances” test used to show
the basis of an informant’s knowledge and veracity.155 The majority opinion sidestepped
Ntakirutimana’s contention that probable cause in this case should not be established by
accepting the government’s evidence.
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The magistrate’s deference may have something to do with his political and
ideological views about isolationism as he was quoted as saying in one of the largest
Texas newspapers that “we are acting here to subordinate U.S. sovereignty to the United
Nations.”156
The ideal decision would have incorporated two important revelations about
genocide and mass violations of human rights that have become crucial to deciding
similar cases. Both revelations are highlighted in the trial of Adolf Eichmann: (1) that
ordinarily good people can be induced to commit terrifying crimes and (2) that the
“community of nations” has sought an extended jurisdictional reach for genocide
prosecutions. The first revelation is clearly defined by Hanna Arendt. While writing
about the Eichmann trial in 1961, she exemplified this statement: “The trouble with
Eichmann was precisely that so many were like him, and that the many were neither
perverted nor sadistic, that they were, and still are, terribly and terrifyingly normal.” 157
Arendt described Eichmann and those like him as “a new type of criminal” who commits
his crimes “under circumstances that make it well-nigh impossible for him to know or to
feel that he is doing wrong.”158 The second revelation in based on the principle of
universal jurisdiction.159 The Geneva Conventions require contracting states to search for
those accused of committing or ordering “grave breaches” of humanitarian law and to
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David Mclemore, Rwandan War Crimes Suspect to Remain Jailed in Laredo, DALLAS MORNING NEWS
(Oct. 12, 1996 at 25a). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 65.]
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HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL 253 (1963).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 56.]
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Id. at 253.
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Ruth Wedgwood, National Courts and the Prosecution of War Crimes, at 396 (1 GABRIELLE KIRK
MCDONALD AND OLIVIA SWAAK-GOLDMAN EDS., SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, 2000). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 76.]
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bring them before their national courts (or possibly an international tribunal) for trial.160
The Israeli trial court opined that genocide was a crime with “harmful and murderous
effects . . . so embracing and widespread as to shake the international community to its
very foundations.”161 The Ntakirutimana trilogy ignores the gravity of the offenses
committed in Rwanda and the majority, concurrence, and dissent concentrate on the
procedural obstacles and merits to surrendering the accused. One would think that Judge
Garza, and others, could have made a strong argument for the surrender of Ntakirutimana
based on the breach of international humanitarian law.
Even though the complicated application of the surrender procedure was not
anticipated by the government, scholars argue that the surrender of Ntakirutimana
illustrates how “well-functioning national courts will remain a keystone structure for any
international criminal tribunal.”162 However, it remains to be seen whether U.S. courts
will consistently adopt the rationale of the Ntakirutimana trilogy in future surrender
proceedings. If so, another court might rule differently. However, other courts may
incorporate the principles of the Eichmann case concerning genocide and other crimes
against humanity as do international tribunals.
V.

Status of Indictees or Non-Indicted Criminals After the Sunset of
the Tribunals

A. Reference to Situation of Former World War II Nazis

160

MORRIS and SCHARF, supra note 18, at 10. These provisions “[do] not exclude handing over the accused
to an international criminal court whose competence has been recognized by the Contracting Parties.”
(quoting JEAN S. PICTET, ED., THE COMMENTARY TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS IV 593 (1958). Id. at N.
50.
161
Id.
162
Id. at 409.
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What took place in Rwanda has been referred to as the “third unquestionable
genocide of the twentieth century.”163 The mass rapes, murder, and torture as part of the
systematic Hutu program of ethnic cleansing is reminiscent of Nazi genocide. Similar to
the Nuremberg Tribunal, the international community deemed it necessary to create the
ICTR. This section examines what happens to these indictees and non-indicted criminals
after the sunset of the Tribunals by identifying U.S. law pertaining to the entry of
genocidaires164 and specifically with reference to the situation of former World War II
Nazis.
In August 1945, the victorious allied governments of France, the United
Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union concluded an agreement providing for
the establishment of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (“The Charter”) to
try the most notorious Nazis accused of crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity.165 The Charter established binding law for the Nuremberg Tribunal in
the war crimes trials.166 The Charter’s provision for the charge of “crimes against
humanity” supplied the rationale behind the U.S. government’s commitment to exclude
Nazis from U.S. territory.167 Although the Ex Post Facto provision of the United States
Constitution precludes criminal prosecution of such individuals, the Department of
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Mark Huband, Rwanda—The Genocide, in Crimes of War, at 312 (ROY GUTMAN AND DAVID RIEFF,
[Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 60.]
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This term is used to describe those who commit acts of genocide. Lindsey Hilsum, Rwanda—Refugees
and Genocidaires, supra note 163, at 316. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 60.]
165
MORRIS and SCHARF, supra note 18, at 13. The Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of
Major War Criminals of the European Axis (London Agreement) provided the blueprint for the Nuremberg
Tribunal. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 52.]
166
Id.
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Cong. Rec. 31,648 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1978) (statement of Rep. Fish) (noting that the Immigration and
Naturalization Act in force in 1978 did not require the exclusion or deportation of persons who persecuted
under the Nazi Government’s orders and finding it necessary to do so as “long overdue” statement of
United States policy “to condemn such conduct”). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 85.]
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justice sought a need to create a system of civil deportation and denaturalization
proceedings to embody the spirit of Nuremberg.168
B. U.S. Immigration Law and Reference to the Crime of Genocide
(1) Historical Examination and the Evolution of the Law
Thirty years after the sunset of the Nuremberg Tribunal, the Soviets had held
many trials to prosecute “Hitlerites” living in the United States, while the United States
had held none, and many were living in the United States.169 This “exodus” of Nazi war
criminals into the United States was possible because of lax immigration laws. Congress
passed the Displaced Persons Act ("DPA") in 1948, shortly after World War II, to
temporarily eliminate restrictive immigration quotas and to allow relief to persons
displaced by war.170 In 1950, Congress amended section 13 of the DPA to expressly bar
issuing an entrance visa "to any person who advocated or assisted in the persecution of
any person because of race, religion, or national origin.”171
Congressional adoption of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 ("INA of
1952") represented the first comprehensive statement of U.S. immigration policy.172
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Eli M. Rosenbaum, The Investigation and Prosecution of Suspected Nazi War Criminals: A
Comparative Overview, 21 Patterns of Prejudice 17, 17-18 (1987) (explaining the inability to institute
criminal proceedings given the Ex Post Facto Clause in the United States Constitution, so that persons who
participated in the Nazi persecution enjoy exemption in the United States for all criminal proceedings
against them based on their persecutory conduct in Europe during World War II). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 68.]
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ALLAN A. RYAN, JR., QUIET NEIGHBORS: PROSECUTING NAZI WAR CRIMINALS IN AMERICA 77 (1984).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab.] See also William J. Eaton, Soviets Execute Ex-Nazi
Guard Deported by U.S., L.A. TIMES, July 28, 1987, at 1. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 54.]
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Displaced Persons Act of 1948, ch. 647, § 2(B), 62 Stat. 1009 (1948) (hereinafter DPA). [Reproduced in
the accompanying notebook at Tab 10.]
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1950 Amendment to Displaced Persons Act, ch. 262, 64 Stat. 219, 227 (1950) (hereinafter DPA
Amendment). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11.]
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Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1953) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a)
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Unlike the DPA, the INA of 1952 did not contain a provision explicitly excluding
persons who assisted in persecution,173 allowing Nazis to enter the United States.
At the time of its implementation, few critics predicted that it would facilitate the
entry of Nazis into the United States because at the time the regulation of refugees
allowed to enter was the primary concern.174 Until the 1970s, some lawmakers, frustrated
by what was openly becoming a policy to ignore the evidence that pointed to the
existence of Nazis in the United States, insisted that the Department of Justice investigate
suspected Nazi war criminals found in the United States.175
Congress abolished this loophole by enacting the 1978 Holtzman Amendment.176
Section 103 of the 1978 Amendment expressly excluded individuals who participated in
the Nazi persecution.177
In 1979, the U.S. Attorney General established the Office of the Special
Investigations (the “OSI”), which assumed responsibility for the civil enforcement of the
United States immigration and citizenship laws against participants in Nazi-sponsored
persecution.178 The OSI enforces these laws against persons who, acting on behalf of or
173

Id.
RYAN, supra note 169, at 5. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 54.]
175
Id. at 6.
176
Immigration and Nationality Act -- Nazi-Germany, Pub. L. No. 95-549, 92 Stat. 2065 (1978) (codified at
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(E)(i) (1994)) (hereinafter Holtzman Amendment). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 13.]
177
Id. The Act explicitly denied entrance to or made subject to deportation:
any alien who, during the period beginning on March 23, 1933, and ending on May 8, 1945, under the
direction of, or in association with(I) the Nazi government in Germany,
(II) any government in any area occupied by the military forces of the Nazi government of Germany,
(III) any government established with the assistance or cooperation of the Nazi government of Germany, or
(IV) any government which was an ally of the Nazi government of Germany, ordered, incited, or otherwise
participated in the persecution of any person because of race, religion, national origin, or political opinion.
178
See generally RYAN, supra note 169, at 246-72 (outlining the OSI’s specific history and role in
prosecuting perpetrators of Nazi-sponsored persecution). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 54.] The OSI specifically enforces three statutes: (1) 8 U.S.C. 1451(a) (1995), revoking naturalization
based on concealment of a material fact or willful misrepresentation [reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 14]; (2) 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(E) (1995), excluding participants in the Nazi persecution
174
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in association with the Third Reich or its allies, served in organizations that persecuted
civilians and prisoners of war.179 The Attorney General’s order of 1979 granted the OSI
the Nazi “hunting” duties.180
The Justice Department now had a mechanism for investigating suspected Nazi
war criminals living in the United States. Those criminals, previously allowed to enter
now faced the wrath of the OSI which would initiate proceedings to expel them from the
United States once it established proof of their complicity in the Nazi atrocities.
Congress enacted the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990 (the “INA of
1990”) that retained the provisions of the Holtzman Amendment and added provisions
that precluded entry into the United States for aliens who participated in genocide.181
Specifically, these new provisions affect the refuge status of these suspected war
criminals by prohibiting entry to aliens who engaged in conduct that is defined as
genocide for purposes of the Genocide Convention.182 Unfortunately, the section 212(a)
language represents the extent of the legislative guidance on interpreting who is a
participant of genocide. However, according to the State Department, "although no
specific legislative background could be found, Congress apparently intended to exclude

[reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14]; and (3) 8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(4)(D) (1995), deporting
aliens who engaged in genocide or assisted in Nazi persecution [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 14].
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See generally RYAN, supra note 169, at 246-72. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 54.]
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United States v. Gecas, 120 F.3d 1419, 1423 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing Transfer of Functions of the Special
Litigation Unit Within the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Department of Justice to the
Criminal Division of the Department of Justice, Order of the U.S. Attorney General, No. 851-79 (Sept. 4,
1979). The order assigned to the OSI responsibility for "detecting, investigating, and, where appropriate,
taking legal action to deport ... any individual who was admitted as an alien into ... the United States and
who had assisted the Nazis by persecuting any person because of race, religion, national origin, or political
opinion." Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 47.]
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Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.), at 212(A)(3)(E). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook
at Tab 14.]
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Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S.
277, 280 (Genocide Convention) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 18.]
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any alien whose behavior, though similar to that found excludable under the Nazi
provisions, violated more universal standards."183
(2) Implementation and Interagency Coordination
The Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”), the Department of Justice,
and the Department of State conduct implementation of these provisions.184 Under the
current system, aliens seeking either an immigrant or nonimmigrant visa to enter the
United States are required to submit a visa application to U.S. officials.185 Aliens are
asked to disclose whether they have participated in Nazi persecution or participated in
genocide.186 In addition, an interagency watch-list identifies individuals suspected of
having participated in Nazi persecution or acts of genocide.187 Furthermore, all cases of
183

U.S. Dep't of State, Foreign Affairs Manual, 40.35 (b), at n. 1 (emphasis added) (hereinafter Foreign
Affairs Manual). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 93.]
184
William J. Aceves and Paul L. Hoffman, Using Immigration Law to Protect Human Rights: A
Legislative Proposal, 20 MICH. J. INT’L L. 657, 666 (1999). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 80.]
185
Id.
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Id. The Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration asks aliens whether they "participated in
Nazi persecutions or genocide," whether they "engaged in genocide," whether they "are a member or
representative of a terrorist organization as currently designated by the U.S. Secretary of State," or whether
they have committed a crime involving moral turpitude. In contrast, the Nonimmigrant Visa Application
asks aliens whether they have "ever ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution
of any person because of race, religion, national origin, or political opinion under the control, direct or
indirect, of the Nazi Government of Germany, or of the government of any area occupied by, or allied with,
the Nazi Government of Germany, or have you ever participated in genocide," or whether they are "a
member or representative of a terrorist organization." Under the Nonimmigrant Visa Application, therefore,
an individual who has committed human rights violations is not obligated to disclose such information on
the application. Finally, the Application for Asylum asks aliens to disclose whether "you, your spouse or
child[ren] ever caused harm or suffering to any person because of his or her race, religion, nationality,
membership in particular social group or political opinion, or ever ordered or assisted in such acts."
187
Id. at 666. In April 1987, the most high-profile use of the watch-list barred Austrian President Kurt
Waldheim, from the U.S. because of his participation in the Nazi persecution of civilians and Allied
prisoners during World War II. Waldheim joined a list of about 10,000 people at the time with Nazi
backgrounds that are barred from entering the United States. Both the Justice and State Departments
accused Waldheim of lying about his wartime service. During the summer of 1942, Waldheim, then a
German army lieutenant, served in the Axis campaign in Yugoslavia. During that campaign, “partisans and
citizens were shot on the spot, and thousands of others were turned over to the Nazi SS or the puppet
Croatian regime for slave labor. The Justice Department said Waldheim was responsible for processing
these prisoners, including about 220 Jews who were shipped to concentration camps, and of the deportation
of 2,000 Jews on the island of Corfu, as well as approving the dissemination of Nazi propaganda. Philip
Shenon, U.S. Disputes Waldheim Assertions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1988, A3.; Glen Elsasser, U.S. Bars
Kurt Waldheim, Cites Service with Nazis, CHI. TRIBUNE, Apr. 28, 1987, C1.; Associates Press, U.S. Bars
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possible ineligibility under the Nazi persecution or genocide provisions require a security
advisory opinion from the State Department and if the State Department determines that
an alien has participated in acts of Nazi persecution or genocide, a visa may not be
issued. 188 If an alien arrives at a U.S. port-of-entry, the INS conducts an eligibility
determination by checking the names of such aliens against a separate watch list, known
as the National Automated Immigration Lookout System.189 Aliens who do not require a
visa because of their nationality must fill out a Nonimmigrant Visa Waiver Form which
nonetheless requires the alien to disclose whether they were ever involved in acts of Nazi
persecution or genocide.190
(3) The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990
The INA of 1990 precludes entry to aliens who participated in Nazi persecution or
who committed acts of genocide. Specifically, the INA of 1990 contains the following
restrictions: (a) ineligibility for admission; (b) preclusion from waiver of inadmissibility;
(c) denaturalization; (d) ineligibility for withholding of removal on grounds of anticipated
persecution; (e) deportation; (f) ineligibility for voluntary departure; and (g) ineligibility
for cancellation of removal.191

Waldheim Entry Over Charges of Nazi Past; First Head of State to be Banned, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1987,
1:1. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 61.] Japanese citizens have also been put on the
OSI Watch-List. See Ronald J. Ostrow, U.S. Bars 2 Repentant Japan Veterans; History: They Were to be
Part of Tour Chronicling WWII-Era Atrocities in Which They Participated. Law Forbids Entry to
Suspected War Criminals, L.A. TIMES, June 25, 1998, A9.; see also James Dao, U.S. Bars Japanese Who
Admits War Crime, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1998, A3. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
62.]
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Foreign Affairs Manual, supra note 183, at 40.35(a) PN. 4, 40.35(b), at N.5. [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 93.]
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Hoffman and Aceves, supra note 184, at 667. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab.]
190
8 C.F.R. 217.1-.2 (1999). In 1986, a visa waiver program was established for visitors from certain
countries. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 80.]
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See infra note 192 to 212 and accompanying text. Several other provisions also preclude immigration
relief to aliens who participated in Nazi persecution or who committed acts of genocide. See also, 8 U.S.C.
1101(a)(42) (definition of refugee) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14.]; 8 U.S.C.
1158(b)(2)(A)(i) (addressing an alien’s eligibility for political asylum) [Reproduced in the accompanying
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(a) Ineligibility for Admission
Aliens who participated in Nazi persecutions or who committed acts of genocide
are ineligible for admission into the United States. As currently codified, 8 U.S.C.
1182(a)(3)(E) provides in pertinent part:
(a) Classes of aliens ineligible for visas or admission.
Except as otherwise provided in this Act, aliens who are inadmissible
under the following paragraphs are ineligible to receive visas and
ineligible to be admitted to the United States:
...
(3) Security and Related Grounds
...
(E) Participants in Nazi persecutions or genocide.
(i) Participation in Nazi persecutions.
Any alien who, during the period beginning on March 23, 1933, and
ending on May 8, 1945, under the direction of, or in association with (I) the Nazi government of Germany,
(II) any government in any area occupied by the military forces of the
Nazi government of Germany,
(III) any government established with the assistance or cooperation of the
Nazi government of Germany, or
(IV) any government which was an ally of the Nazi government of
Germany, ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the
persecution of any person because of race, religion, national origin, or
political opinion is inadmissible.
(ii) Participation in genocide.
Any alien who has engaged in conduct that is defined as genocide for

notebook at Tab 14]; 8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(1) (eligibility for waiver of any ground of exclusion for
nonimmigrants) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14.]; 8 U.S.C. 1225(c)(1) (eligibility
for removal without further hearings) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14.]; 8 U.S.C.
1231(a)(6) (detention and removal of aliens ordered removed) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook
at Tab 14.]; 8 U.S.C. 1254(c)(2)(A) (temporary protected status) [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 14.]; 8 U.S.C 1255a(d)(2)(B)(ii)(III) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
14.]; 8 U.S.C. 1255(j)(1)(B) (eligibility for adjustment of status to permanent resident status) [Reproduced
in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14.]; 8 U.S.C. 1259 (record of lawful admission) [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 14.].
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purposes of the International Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Genocide is inadmissible.192
(b) Preclusion from Waiver of Inadmissibility
The Attorney General has discretion to waive an alien's ineligibility for
admission.193 8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(3) provides that aliens who participated in Nazi
persecution or who committed acts of genocide are precluded from receiving a
discretionary waiver of inadmissibility. This section provides:
(d). . . temporary admission of nonimmigrants . . .
(1) The Attorney General shall determine whether a ground for inadmissibility
exists with respect to a nonimmigrant described in section 101(a)(15)(S) of this
title. The Attorney General, in the Attorney General's discretion, may waive the
application of subsection (a) of this section (other than paragraph (3)(E)) in the
case of a nonimmigrant described in section 101(a)(15)(S) of this title, if the
Attorney General considers it to be in the national interest to do so. Nothing in
this section shall be regarded as prohibiting the Immigration and Naturalization
Service from instituting removal proceedings against an alien admitted as a
nonimmigrant under section 101(a)(15)(S) of this title for conduct committed
after the alien's admission into the United States, or for conduct or a condition that
was not disclosed to the Attorney General prior to the alien's admission as a
nonimmigrant under section 101(a)(15)(S) of this title.
...
(3) Except as provided in this subsection, an alien (A) who is applying for a
nonimmigrant visa and is known or believed by the consular officer to be
ineligible for such visa under subsection (a) (other than paragraphs (3)(A)(i)(I),
(3)(A)(ii), (3)(A)(iii), (3)(C), and (3)(E) of such subsection), may, after approval
by the Attorney General of a recommendation by the Secretary of State or by the
consular officer that the alien be admitted temporarily despite his inadmissibility,
be granted such a visa and may be admitted into the United States temporarily as
a nonimmigrant in the discretion of the Attorney General, or (B) who is
inadmissible under subsection (a) (other than paragraphs (3)(A)(i)(I), (3)(A)(ii),
(3)(A)(iii), (3)(C), and (3)(E) of such subsection), but who is in possession of
appropriate documents or is granted a waiver thereof and is seeking admission,
may be admitted into the United States temporarily as a nonimmigrant in the
discretion of the Attorney General.194
192

INA of 1990 § 212(a)(3)(E), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(E) (2002). [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 14.]
193
Aceves and Hoffman, supra note 184, at 670. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 80.]
194
INA of 1990 § 212(d), 8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(3) (2002). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
14.]
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(c) Denaturalization
The provisions on revocation of naturalization are codified at 8 U.S.C. 1451.195 8
U.S.C. 1451(a) places the duty to institute denaturalization proceedings where an order
admitting a person to citizenship and the certificate of naturalization "were illegally
procured or were procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful
misrepresentation" on U.S. attorneys.196 Despite omission of specific reference to Nazis
or Nazi persecution, this section has been used to seek denaturalization of aliens who
concealed or misrepresented their past association with the Nazis during World War II.197
It would also apply to aliens who concealed or misrepresented acts of genocide in
Rwanda or the former Yugoslavia.198
(d) Deportation
If an alien, found to be ineligible for immigration benefits, is nonetheless present
in the United States, deportation proceedings are instituted. This applies to aliens who
were either inadmissible at time of entry, who assisted in Nazi persecution, or who
engaged in acts of genocide. 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(4)(D) provides:
(a) Classes of deportable aliens.
Any alien (including an alien crewman) in and admitted to the United States
shall, upon the order of the Attorney General, be removed if the alien is within
one or more of the following classes of deportable aliens:
(1) Inadmissible at time of entry or of adjustment of status or violates status.
(A) Inadmissible aliens.
195

8 U.S.C. 1427 (2002) (describing the requirements for naturalization). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 14.]
196
8 U.S.C. 1451(a) (2002). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14.]
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Aceves and Hoffman, supra note 184, at 672. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 80.]
See generally Lisa J. Del Pizzo, Not Guilty-But Not Innocent: An Analysis of the Acquital of John
Demjanjuk, 18 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 137 (1995). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 72.] See generally Shari B. Gersten, United States v. Kungys: Clarifying the Materiality Standard in
Denaturalization Proceedings?, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 429 (1989). [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 78.]
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Aceves and Hoffman, supra note 184, at 672. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 80.]
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Any alien who at the time of entry or adjustment of status was within one or
more of the classes of aliens inadmissible by the law existing at such time is
deportable.
...
(4) Security and related grounds.
...
(D) Assisted in Nazi persecution or engaged in genocide.
Any alien described in clause (i) or (ii) or section 212(a)(3)(E) [8 U.S.C.
1182(a)(3)(E)(i) or (ii)] is deportable.199
(e) Ineligibility for Withholding of Removal on Grounds of Anticipated Persecution
Aliens who participated in Nazi persecution or who committed acts of genocide
are ineligible for the benefits of 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3)(A) which precludes the Attorney
General from removing an alien to a country where that alien's life or freedom would be
threatened because of his race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion.200 This exception applies to crimes that extend outside the
scope of the definition of genocide. The alien can nonetheless be removed from the
United States if the Attorney General decides that the alien ordered, incited, assisted, or
participated in the persecution of an individual because of the individual's race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. The relevant
portion of 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3) provides:
(b) Countries to which aliens may be removed.
...
(3) Restriction on removal to a country where alien's life or freedom would be
threatened.
(A) In general.
Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2), the Attorney General may not remove an
alien to a country if the Attorney General decides that the alien's life or freedom
would be threatened in that country because of the alien's race, religion,
199

INA of 1990 § 237(a)(4)(D), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(4)(D) (2002). [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 14.]
200
8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3)(A) (2002). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14.]
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nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.
(B) Exception.
Subparagraph (A) does not apply to an alien deportable under section
237(a)(4)(D) [8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(4)(D)] or if the Attorney General decides that (i) the alien ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution
of an individual because of the individual's race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion;201
(f) Ineligibility for Voluntary Departure
Under normal proceedings, an alien is allowed to voluntary depart, which
eliminates the five-year bar to entry that attaches to a deportation order.202 The Attorney
General has this discretion, and voluntary departure can be requested before removal
proceedings or at the conclusion of removal proceedings.203 This provision is not
available to aliens who participated in Nazi persecution or who committed acts of
genocide.204 Section 240B(e) that precludes voluntary removal at this stage.205 8 U.S.C.
1229c(a) provides:
(a) Certain conditions.
(1) In general.
The Attorney General may permit an alien voluntarily to depart the United States
at the alien's own expense under this subsection, in lieu of being subject to
proceedings under section 240 or prior to the completion of such proceedings, if
the alien is not deportable under section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) or section 237 (a)(4)(B).
...
(b) At conclusion of proceedings.
(1) In general.
The Attorney General may permit an alien voluntarily to depart the United States
201

8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3)(A) (2002). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14.]
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See 8 C.F.R. 240.26(b)(1)(E) (2002). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 15.]
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at the alien's own expense if, at the conclusion of a proceeding under section 240,
the immigration judge enters an order granting voluntary departure in lieu of
removal and finds that ...
(c) the alien is not deportable under section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) or section
237(a)(4);206
(g) Ineligibility for Cancellation of Removal
According to 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a), the Attorney General may cancel removal in the
case of an alien who is inadmissible or deportable from the United States if the alien: (a)
has been an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence for not less than 5 years; (b)
has resided in the United States continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in
any status; and (3) has not been convicted of any aggravated felony.207 However, 8
U.S.C. 1229b(c)(4) provides that the Attorney General may not cancel removal of "an
alien who is inadmissible under section 212(a)(3) or deportable under section
237(a)(4),"208 in other words, who participated in Nazi persecution or committed acts of
genocide.
The relevant provisions of U.S. immigration law are summarized below. Aliens
who participated in Nazi persecutions or who committed acts of genocide are ineligible
for admission into the United States. The U.S. Attorney General, which generally has
discretion to waive an alien's ineligibility for admission, is precluded from receiving a
discretionary waiver of inadmissibility. U.S. attorneys have a duty to institute
denaturalization proceedings where an order admitting a person to citizenship and the
certificate of naturalization "were illegally procured or were procured by concealment of
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a material fact or by willful misrepresentation."209 If an alien, found to be ineligible for
entry, is nonetheless present in the United States, deportation proceedings are instituted.
This applies to aliens who were either inadmissible at time of entry, who assisted in Nazi
persecution, or who engaged in acts of genocide. The alien can nonetheless be removed
from the United States if the Attorney General decides that the alien ordered, incited,
assisted, or participated in the persecution of an individual because of the individual's
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion,
even though the Attorney General is otherwise precluded from removing an alien to a
country where that alien's life or freedom would be threatened because of his race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.210
Finally, the provision of voluntary departure, which eliminates the five-year bar to entry
that attaches to a deportation order, is not available to aliens who participated in Nazi
persecution or who committed acts of genocide.211
C. Case Law Analyzing the Refugee and Immigration Status of Former World
War II Nazis
U.S. case law dealing with Nazi war criminals is helpful in analyzing the refugee and
immigration status of those accused of genocide and may be of assistance in deciding
how the refugee and immigration status of indicted or non-indicted criminals from
Rwanda or the Former Yugoslavia will be affected.
(1) Fedorenko v. United States
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The Supreme Court's analysis in Fedorenko v. United States212 is a post-World
War II decision dealing with the status of Nazis found in the United States. The case is
of use when analyzing deportation and refugee cases due to the similarity of the crimes of
World War II Nazis and indicted or non-indicted criminals of Rwanda and the Former
Yugoslavia based on the genocide provisions of the INA of 1990.
The Supreme Court held that even involuntary service as a Nazi guard is within
the congressional intent to deport Nazi participants. Thus, in a genocide case, a
participant may not use involuntary service as a defense.213 In other words, once a court
determines that an individual participated in either Nazi persecutions or acts of genocide,
the court has no choice but to deport the individual. A court cannot examine such
mitigating factors as duration of citizenship in the United States and familial ties in the
country.214 This demonstrates the strong U.S. policy against admitting individuals who
have committed such atrocities.
In 1984, Fyodor Fedorenko became the first person to be deported from the
United States to the Soviet Union to face charges that he committed Nazi war crimes.215
It is one of the most important cases in the contemporary era dealing with
denaturalization and revocation of U.S. citizenship due to wartime activities. Fedorenko
was a member of the Russian Army in 1941 before capture by the German army.216
Fedorenko spent time at a Nazi camp in Travnicki, Poland, to train as a concentration
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camp guard and later was assigned as a guard at the Nazi concentration camp in
Treblinka, Poland, a labor camp at Danzig and then to a prisoner-of-war camp at
Poelitz.217 Shortly before the British forces entered the city of Poelitz in 1945, he
discarded his German uniform to pass as a civilian.218 When Fedorenko applied for
admission to the United States in 1949, he lied on his visa application by stating that he
was a farmer in Poland when the Germans abducted him and forced him to work in a
factory until the end of the war.219 Not only were his false statements not discovered, but
he reused his lies when he applied for naturalization in 1969 during sworn testimony, and
the United States granted him citizenship in 1970.220
In 1977, the government filed a district court action to revoke Fedorenko's
citizenship because he procured his naturalization illegally by misrepresenting material
facts.221 At trial, Fedorenko admitted his service as an armed guard, conceded that he
made false statements to procure the visa, but claimed that he was forced to serve and
denied any personal involvement in the atrocities.222 The district court entered judgment
against deportation in favor of Fedorenko, finding that: (1) he was forced to serve as a
guard; (2) the false statements were not material; (3) the government had not met its
burden in proving that he committed war crimes or atrocities at Treblinka; and (4) even
assuming misrepresentation of material facts, equitable and mitigating circumstances
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permitted him to retain his citizenship.223 The Justice Department appealed to the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals, which reversed the district court.224
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.225
The Supreme Court first held that "an individual's service as a concentration camp armed
guard—whether voluntary or involuntary—made him ineligible for a visa . . . Under
traditional principles of statutory construction, the deliberate omission of the word
'voluntary' from § 2(a) [of the DPA] compels the conclusion that the statute made all
those who assisted in the persecution of civilians ineligible for visas."226 The decision
infers that a solution to involuntary participation was built into the Act by examining the
conduct of the individual himself to determine whether it warranted exclusion on the
basis of persecution.227
Second, the Court held that "district courts lack equitable discretion to refrain
from entering a judgment of denaturalization against a naturalized citizen whose
citizenship was procured illegally or by willful misrepresentation of material facts."228
The court reasoned that “[a]n alien who seeks political rights as a member of this Nation
can rightfully obtain them only upon the terms and conditions specified by Congress.
Courts are without authority to sanction changes or modifications; their duty is rigidly to
enforce the legislative and will in respect of a matter so vital to the public welfare.”229 In
June 1986, after his deportation, a court in Crimea in the Soviet Ukraine sentenced
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Fedorenko to death on charges of treason and taking part in mass executions at the
Treblinka death camp.230
(2) Petkiewytsch v. INS
Subsequent to Fedorenko, lower courts had great difficulty determining what type
of conduct constituted "assisting the persecution of civilians."231 The Sixth Circuit found
that Petkiewytsch did not assist in the Nazi effort to the extent of Fedorenko. The court
reasoned that not only did Fedorenko deliberately conceal his involvement as a guard, but
he also admitted to shooting in the general direction of escaping prisoners during his
guard service.232
Leonid Petkiewytsch was captured and assigned to a labor-education camp in
Kiel, Germany, to serve as a civilian guard.233 Petkiewytsch, whose primary
responsibility was to prevent prisoners from escaping the camp, was issued a Gestapo SS
uniform, given a rifle, and instructed on how to escort prisoners to and from work sites
and how to clean and load his rifle.234 Although he was under orders to shoot anyone
attempting to escape, he never used his rifle nor inflicted any physical abuse on the
prisoners during his eight-month service as a guard.235
Petkiewytsch first applied for entrance into the United States in March 1948 under
the DPA but was denied entrance because of his stated service as a civilian guard at the
labor-education camp.236 Petkiewytsch reapplied and was granted an admission visa in
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1955 under the INA of 1952, which, as previously explained, then contained no provision
denying admission to those who participated in the Nazi persecutions.237
In July 1985, the INS issued an Order to Show Cause stating that Petkiewytsch
was deportable under the Holtzman Amendment of 1978, for "assisting or otherwise
participating in Nazi persecution."238 The court ruled against deportation because the
petitioner had not personally engaged in any persecutional acts and that his "wrongful
conduct, at most, was his acceptance under duress of his duties as a civilian laboreducation camp guard."239
The INS appealed the decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”).240
The Board focused on the issue of whether "the 'objective effect' of the petitioner's
conduct controlled and that the 'objective effect' of his service as civilian guard was to
assist the Nazis in their persecution of those within Kiel-Hasse by preventing their
escape."241 The Board determined that Petkiewytsch’s actual conduct was irrelevant,
because “persons were persecuted based upon race, religion, national origin, or political
opinion."242
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Board's decision by focusing on
Petkiewytsch’s personal involvement, concentrating on "whether particular conduct can
be considered assisting in the persecution of civilians."243 Determining the extent of
personal involvement required when interpreting the "Nazi participation" under U.S.
immigration law was never solidly identified.
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(3) Lower Court Decisions Following Federenko and Petkiewytsch
This inquiry, determining the extent of personal involvement, left significant
discretion to subsequent courts in deciding where the lines should be drawn. In Schellong
v. INS the Seventh Circuit affirmed the Immigration Appeals' deportation order because
the petitioner misrepresented that he had never served at a concentration camp, which
was construed as an attempt to mislead government authorities to gain entrance to the
United States.244 The same court held in United States v. Kairys that the defendant was
statutorily excluded from immigration to the United States because of his alleged
involvement as a Nazi concentration camp guard.245 Defendant's subsequent
naturalization was illegally procured as he did not meet a statutory requirement at time of
naturalization. In Laipenieks v. INS the Ninth Circuit held that an order finding the
petitioner, who was accused of assisting the Nazi government in the persecution of
Communists during World War II, deportable was reversed because there was
insufficient evidence to show that any of petitioner's investigations resulted in the
ultimate persecution of an individual because of his political beliefs.246 The Second
Circuit held in Maikovskis v. INS that the petitioner was deportable (1) under the
Immigration and Nationality Act for making material misrepresentations in his visa
application concerning his role as a policeman in Rezekne from 1941 through 1943,
where he participated or acquiesced in the arrest of a number of peaceful civilian
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inhabitants of Audrini and in the burning of their dwellings, and (2) under the INA for his
assistance to the Nazis.247
(4) John Demjanjuk
The denaturalization and deportation process is a long process that can take up to
ten years.248 The alternative, extradition, is an expedited procedure, but is only available
when a second nation files a formal request for a particular suspect’s extradition.249 U.S.
courts have not heard many extradition requests.
John Demjanjuk, a native of the Ukraine, was conscripted into the Soviet Army in
1940, and was captured by German forces.250 He was recruited by the German S.S. in
1942, where he was transferred to Trawniki, Poland, and then sent to work at the
Treblinka death camp in Poland, where he operated the gas chambers.251 Demjanjuk
applied for immigration to the United States in 1948.252 In his visa application, which led
to his naturalization in 1958, he misrepresented his whereabouts from 1937 to 1948, and
failed to disclose his wartime activities.253 The Department of Justice initiated
denaturalization proceedings, which followed the Federenko precedent. However, in
1983, during the deportation proceedings, Israel requested extradition.254
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The extradition court first must determine whether the person before the court is
the same individual who is charged in the requesting country.255 Next, the court must
certify that the offenses charged constitute extraditable offenses under the provisions of
the applicable treaty.256 Finally, the court must determine whether there exists probable
cause to believe that the accused committed the offenses charged, but the ultimate
decision of guilt or innocence lies with the judiciary of the requesting nation.257 The
district court found probable cause to believe that Demjanjuk was “Ivan the Terrible,”
based on eyewitness affidavits that identified photographs of Demjanjuk as Ivan the
Terrible.258 In 1985, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio
entered an order certifying to the Secretary of States that Demjanjuk was subject to
extradition pursuant to the Extradition Treaty between the United States and Israel.259
The Sixth Circuit affirmed this order, and on February 28, 1986, Demjanjuk was
extradited to Israel to stand trial.260
The Supreme Court of Israel eventually acquitted Demjanjuk in 1993 after a
sixteen-year legal battle in the United States.
(5) Quantum of Proof and the Applicability of the INA of 1990
The cases of deportation and extradition dealing with Nazi war criminals are
based on the utilization of documentary and testimonial evidence to prove that the war
time activities of the alleged criminals falls within the definition of Nazi participation.
The surrender proceedings of Ntakirutimana were based on similar eyewitness accounts
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combined with an indictment by the ICTR. However, in the case where the surrender of
a suspected genocide criminal is requested without an indictment, courts will likely look
to the evidence forwarded in support of a surrender request by the ICTR, as specified in
section 1342(a)(3).261 The practice is that orders for surrender can be issued upon
confirmation of an indictment against that person.262 There is no case law on the subject
to properly determine what quantum of proof is necessary for cases of unindicted persons
suspected of genocide. However, U.S. courts may draw on case law dealing with Nazi
war criminals.
The United States only became a member-state to the Genocide Convention on
November 4, 1988, when Congress passed the Genocide Implementation Act of 1987
("Implementation Act").263 The purpose of this Implementation Act was to (1) establish a
new federal offense that prohibits the commission of acts with the specific intent to
destroy, in whole or in substantial part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group; and
(2) to provide penalties for such destruction.264 This ultimate effect of the
Implementation Act was to set the legislative course for including genocide as an
excludable offense in U.S. immigration law and its inclusion in the INA of 1990.
However, there is no mention of genocide in the legislative history of the INA of
1990. Consequently, the Genocide Convention, the legislative history of the
Implementation Act, and Nazi case law serve as the only source of guidance in
determining the quantum of proof necessary for cases of unindicted persons suspected of
261
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genocide.265
(a) Legislative History of the Implementation Act
On May 21, 1985, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted unanimously to
send the Genocide Convention back to the Senate floor for further consideration along
with some attached Committee provisions.266 On February 19, 1986, the Senate voted
eighty-three to eleven in favor of its ratification subject to Senate Foreign Relations
Committee's provisions, which attached two reservations and five understandings to the
Implementation Act.267
The Senate's advice and consent is subject to the following understandings, which
apply to the obligations of the United States under this Convention:
(1) That the term "intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical,
racial, or religious group as such" appearing in Article II means the specific intent
to destroy, in whole or in substantial part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group as such by the acts specified in Article II.
(2) That the term "mental harm" in Article II(b) means permanent impairment
of mental faculties through drugs, torture or similar techniques.
(3) That the pledge to grant extradition in accordance with a state's laws and
treaties in force found in Article VII extends only to acts which are criminal under
the laws of both the requesting and the requested state and nothing in Article VI
affects the right of any state to bring to trial before its own tribunals any of its
nationals for acts committed outside a state.
(4) The acts in the course of armed conflicts committed without the specific
intent required by Article II are not sufficient to constitute genocide as defined by
this Convention.
(5) That with regard to the reference to an international penal tribunal in Article
VI of the Convention, the United States declares that it reserves the right to effect
its participation in *934 any such tribunal only by a treaty entered into
specifically for that purpose with the advice and consent of the Senate.268
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Despite these five understandings, and another two reservations,269 the Committee
made no recommendation for amending the scope of “genocide” under the Convention.270
The addition of genocide to immigration law occurred two years later to accord with
Article V of the Genocide Convention as "necessary legislation to give effect to the
provisions of the present Convention."271
(b) Analysis
As previously stated, U.S. courts have had to act as fact-finders in Nazi
deportation and extradition cases. No reported decisions have discussed the deportation
of aliens who have engaged in genocide since the enactment of the INA of 1990. A U.S.
court will have to engage in a similar role when faced with interpreting the genocide
provisions of the INA of 1990, and with future surrender requests to the ICTR, in the
absence of an indictment. Both the federal district court and the court of appeals in the
Ntakirutimana trilogy relied on the submissions of the ICTR, by the U.S. government,
and the indictment. Although the Nazi decisions lead to the general rule that courts must
inquiry into the extent of personal involvement of a person suspected of genocide
regardless of whether the actions were voluntary of involuntary, there is significant
discretion left to the lower courts. If a U.S. court is supplied and forwarded enough
evidence to hold that the suspected criminal did in fact commit acts of genocide, the
quantum of proof would be fulfilled, regardless of whether there is an indictment.
VI.
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Together, the surrender agreements between the United States and the Tribunals,
combined with Congressional enactment of the executive agreements, are a valid
substitute for a traditional extradition agreement in the form of an Article II Treaty. The
Fifth Circuit followed this interpretation, which is supported by many scholars, in holding
that it is constitutional to surrender an indicted criminal to the Tribunals with a statute
and an executive agreement in the absence of a treaty.
U.S. law precludes entry to indictees and non-indicted criminals who committed
acts of genocide. Specifically, the INA of 1990 contains, among other provisions, the
following restrictions: (a) ineligibility for admission; (b) preclusion from waiver of
inadmissibility; (c) denaturalization; (d) ineligibility for withholding of removal on
grounds of anticipated persecution; (e) deportation; (f) ineligibility for voluntary
departure; and (g) ineligibility for cancellation of removal.272 Case law dealing with the
situation of former World War II Nazis is helpful in analyzing the refugee and
immigration status of indicted or non-indicted criminals from Rwanda or the Former
Yugoslavia.
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